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A USER'S GUIDE TO SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION

Diane S Kaplan*
I

T

INTRODUCTION

HE new law of supplemental jurisdiction' combines the common-law
doctrines of pendent and ancillarS jurisdiction to create a constitutional

* The author is a graduate of the Yale Law School and is currently an Associate Professor
of Law at The John Marshall Law School in Chicago Illinois The author wishes to thank
Professor Allen Kamp and research assistant Marisa Rio Koulis for their assistance and advice
I The statute was enacted December 1 1990 as part of the Judicial Improvements Act of
1990 Pub L No 101 650 104 Stat. 5089 (codified as amended at 28 U S C § 1367 (1994)) The
statute provides:

§ 1367 Supplemental jurisdiction
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise
by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims
that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form
part of the same case or controversy under Article I of the United States Constitution
Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention
of additional parties
(b) In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded
solely on section 1332 of this title the district courts shall not have supplemental
jurisdiction under subsection (a) over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties
under Rule 14 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by
persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules or seeking to
intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when exercising supplemental
jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements
of section 1332
(c) The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim
under subsection (a) if(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the
district court has original jurisdiction,
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,
or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining
jurisdiction.
(d) The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a) and for any
other claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed at the same time as or after
the dismissal of the claim under subsection (a) shall be tolled while the claim is pending
and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer
tolling period.
(e) As used in this section, the term State includes the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the United States
2

See United Mine Workers v Gibbs 383 U S 715 725 (1966) (allowing ajurisdictionally
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basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction over claims that are jurisdictionally
insufficient Although recent articles have examined the theoretical aspects of this
new statute,4 none has set forth a methodology for negotiating a section 1367
issue This article assumes that task First, the article illustrates how the
supplemental jurisdiction scheme works in general Second, it demonstrates how
a section 1367 analysis compares in result to its pendent and ancillary jurisdiction
common-law predecessors Last, it presents a decision-tree analysis of questions
and answers to guide the reader through a section 1367 problem The decisiontree analysis applies to virtually every supplemental jurisdiction issue in which the
court's original jurisdiction is based on section 1331 or section 1332, and is
wholly objective and nondoctrinal '
II

THE STATUTE: ITS HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND PROCEDURAL MEANING

A

Definition of Supplemental Jurisdiction

I

Differences Between Section 1331 and Section 1332 Treatment

Section 1367(a) defines supplemental jurisdiction as all jurisdictionally
insufficient claims that are so related to jurisdictionally sufficient claims "that
they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United
States Constitution "6 The "case or controversy" language applies to both section
1331 and section 1332 jurisdiction

insufficient claim to be appended to a jurisdictionally sufficient claim if both claims arose from a
common nucleus of operative facts ') See also Osbom v Bank of the United States 22 U S 738
823 (1824)
3 The common law doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction required the joinder of claims brought
by defendants under Federal Civil Procedure Rules 13(a) 13(g) 14(a) and 24(a) When such
claims were both necessary to the defense and dependent on the original claim See Moore v New
York Cotton Exchange 270 U S 593 (1926); Owen Equipment & Erection Co v Kroger 437 U S
365 (1978)
4 See generally Karen N Moore The Supplemental JurisdictionStatute: An Important But
ControversialSupplement to FederalJurisdiction 41 EMORY L J 31 (1992); Wendy C Perdue The
New Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute-Flawed But Fixable 41 EMORY L J 69 (1992); Joan
Steinman, Section 1367-Another PartyHeard From 41 EMoRY L J 85 (1992); Richard D Freer
Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity Life After Finley and the Supplemental
JurisdictionStatute, 40 EMORY L J 445 (1991); Christopher M Fairman, Abdication to Academia
The Case of the Supplemental JurisdictionStatute 28 US C § 1367, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS J 157
(1994); Dennis McLaughlin, The FederalSupplemental JurisdictionStatute-A Constitutional and
Statutory Analysis 24 APiz L J 849, 861 (1992)
5 According to section 1367(a) the jurisdictionally sufficient claim must arise under the
original jurisdiction of the district court, which means that in addition to sections 1331 and 1332
the jurisdictionally sufficient claim may also be based on sections 1333 1335 1337 1338 1339
& 1343 See Leather s Best, Inc v S S Mormaclynx 451 F 2d 800 810 (2d Cir 1971)
6 28 USC § 1367(a) (1994)
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Example 1
A (Illinois)
v

counterclaim: contract

complaint antitrust

B (Illinois)
In this example, A s federal antitrust claim against B satisfies section 1331
jurisdiction but B's breach of contract counterclaim fails to satisfy section 1332,
since both A and B are from Illinois Nonetheless, under section 1367(a) the
court must exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the counterclaim because, in
addition to being "part of the same case or controversy" as the antitrust claim,7
it is also a compulsory counterclaim under Rule 13(a) s
Example 2
A (New York)
B v. A counterclaim
personal injuries

v
B (Ohio; driver)

complaint personal
injuries arising from car
accident

t
C v. B cross-claim
property damage

C (Ohio, owner)

In this example, A, from New York, sues B and C, both from Ohio, for
personal injuries sustained when A was struck by a car owned by C, but driven
by B The complaint charges B with negligent driving and C with negligent
maintenance of the vehicle B's counterclaim charges A with negligence C's
cross-claim charges B with property damage to the car Jurisdiction, as between
A and B, is based on diversity C's cross-claim against B lacks an independent
jurisdictional basis, since there is no diversity between B and C However, the
court must exercise supplemental jurisdiction over C's cross-claim because it is
"part of the same case or controversy" as A's claim against B and C and is not
barred by section 1367(b) ' Similarly, even if B's counterclaim against A seeks
only $20,000 in damages, the court must exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

7 28 U S C § 1367(a) (1994)
8 FED R Civ P 13(a) See In re Texas E Transmission Corp PCB Contamination Ins
Coverage Litig 15 F 3d 1230 1237 (3d Cir 1994)
9 28 U S C § 1367(b) (1994); Meritor Say Bank v Camelback Canyon Investors 783 F
Supp 455 457 (D Ariz 1991)
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it since it satisfies the "case or controversy" requirement of section 1367(a), even
though it is insufficient under section 1332 "
2

The Case or Controversy versus Common Nucleus of Operative Facts

It is important to note that the "case or controversy under Article III" test has
taken the place of "the common nucleus of operative facts" test of United Mine
Workers v Gibbs " Although both tests require a close relationship between the
jurisdictionally sufficient and jurisdictionally insufficient claims, the two tests are
not identical 2 The distinctions are few, but important
First, although the scope of most jurisdictional statutes is narrower than their
constitutional authority,'3 the scope of the supplemental jurisdiction statute is
coextensive with its constitutional authority under Article 11114 The Gibbs test,
however, was not rooted in the constitution, but rather, in the federal courts'
inherent authority to administer justice fairly, efficiently, and with minimal waste
and burden "5 Therefore, the federal courts' constitutional authority to join
supplemental claims under section 1367 logically should be broader than its
common-law authority under Gibbs 16 Although it is inevitable that the

10 If the counterclaim sought $51 000 in damages supplemental jurisdiction would not be
necessary since the counterclaim itself would satisfy section 1332 diversity 28 U S C § 1332

(1994)
11 383 U S 715, 725 (1966) (approving the use of pendent jurisdiction over a jurisdictionally
insufficient claim that arose from the same common nucleus of operative facts as the
jurisdictionally sufficient claim)
12 But see Salei v Boardwalk Regency Corp No 94-CV 72239 DT 1996 U S Dist LEXIS
739 at *8 9 (ED Mich Jan 23 1996)
13 A comparison of Article III diversity jurisdiction language to section 1332 reveals that the
statute is narrower than its constitutional authority See 28 U S C § 1332 (1994) A similar
difference in scope can be found between Article I federal question jurisdiction and 28 U S C
§ 1331 (1994) See Ankenbrandt v Richards 112 S Ct 2206 2212 (1992) (explaining that if
inferior courts were created, [Congress was not] required to invest them with all the jurisdiction it
was authorized to bestow under Art. II ') (citing Palmore v United States 411 U S 389 401
(1973)) Furthermore federal courts only have the power to preside over cases for which there is
both a constitutional and congressional grant of authority Finley v United States, 490 U S 545,
547-48 (1989)
14 See Brazinski v Amoco Petroleum Additives Co 6 F 3d 1176 1181 (7th Cir 1993);
Palmer v Hospital Authority of Randolph County 22 F 3d 1559 1566 (11th Cir 1994); Lewis v
Richardson, No 94-509 JD, 1995 U S Dist. LEXIS 16607 at *3-4 (D N H Nov 8 1995);
Kedziora v Citicorp Nat Servs Corp, No 91 C-3428 1995 US Dist LEXIS 12137, at *11 12
(N D III Aug 12 1995)
15 Executive Software North America, Inc v United States District Court, 24 F 3d 1545
1552 (9th Cir 1994) To qualify for pendent jurisdiction treatment, the jurisdictionally insufficient
claim had to satisfy one or more of the following tests: (1) logical relationship; (2) transactional
relationship; or (3) substantial commonality of facts, occurrences or causes See Plant v Blazer
Fin Servs 598 F 2d 1357, 1360 (5th Cir 1979)
16 See e g Amco Construction Co v Mississippi State Bldg Comm n, 602 F 2d 730 (5th
Cir 1970) This case arose when a construction project was abandoned, and Stiglet (a Mississippi
corporation and subcontractor) sued Houston General (a Texas corporation and Amco s surety) in
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"common nucleus of operative facts" and "case or controversy" tests will yield
equivalent results in some instances, an argument can be made for broader
jurisdictional authority under section 1367, given its constitutional basis
The broader scope of supplemental jurisdiction is further confirmed in the last
sentence of section 1367(a), which provides that "supplemental jurisdiction shall
include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties "17
This language reverses the decision in Finley v United States,"8 by authorizing
federal courts to preside over supplemental claims brought by or against an
"additional party "19 The following example illustrates the "additional party"
concept
Example 3
A (Illinois)
v
B (Illinois)
C (Illinois)

---

complaint:
antitrust
contract

Mississippi state court for payments due under a performance bond. Houston General removed the
action to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi on the basis of
diversity jurisdiction Id at 732 Holcomb Asphalt Company Inc then intervened as a plaintiff
and Houston impled the project engineer, the Mississippi State Building Commission and Amco
Construction Company, Inc for indemnification and money owed. Id Amco as a third party
defendant, cross-claimed against the commission and project engineer for defective plans
negligence, and breach of contract. Id The Commission filed a counterclaim to Amco s crossclaim for costs incurred for unperformed work. Id Subsequently all claims were either settled or
dismissed except for the cross-claim between Amoco and the Commission, who were not diverse
Id The court dismissed the cross-claim for lack of ancillary jurisdiction because it did not arise
from the same transaction which gave rise to the original claim" and because it was legally and
logically independent of the original claim Id at 733 If section 1367 had been enacted at the
time the court could have exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the cross-claim because it arose
from the same case or controversy as the original claims, even though it did not arise from the
identical transaction and was capable of being litigated independently of such claims
17 28 USC § 1367(a) (1994) See Palmer v Hospital Authority of Randolph County 22
F3d 1559 1567 (11th Cir 1994)
18 490 U S 545 (1989) In this case plaintiff Finley sued the San Diego Gas and Electric
Company and the City of San Diego in California state court for the death of her husband and two
d at 546 The complaint alleged that the defendants had negligently maintained
children
transmission lines and illuminated runway lights, resulting in the crash of the plane that carried her
family Md When Finley subsequently learned that the Federal Aviation Administration was
responsible for the runway lights she filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of California claiming jurisdiction over the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
28 U S C § 1346(b) (1994) Finley also moved to amend her complaint to add the original, but
non-diverse, state court defendants The district court granted her motion, asserting pendent
jurisdiction based on United Mine Workers v Gibbs 383 U S 715 (1966) The United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court
of Appeals, holding that a federal court may only exercise jurisdiction over pendent claims not
pendent parties
19 See Stromberg Metal Works Inc v Press Mechanical, Inc, 77 F 3d 928 (7th Cir 1996)
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In this example, A sues B for a federal antitrust violation, and C for breach of a
contract related to the antitrust violation Under pendent jurisdiction, a federal
court could not preside over A's claim against C because there was neither
diversity nor federal question jurisdiction over the contract claim 20 C was
deemed the ignominious' pendent party "2 However, under section 1367(a), the
court may now exercise supplemental jurisdiction over A s claim against C
because the contract claim "form[s] part of the same case or controversy" as the
antitrust claim 2
Supplemental jurisdiction's "additional party" language can also apply when the
federal court's original jurisdiction is based on section 1332
Example 4
A (Georgia)
B (Georgia)
v
C (Florida)

complaint personal injury
$60,000 damages
$10,000 damages

In this example, father A and daughter B are simultaneously injured when the
car in which they are driver and passenger is hit by C Diversity exists between
A and C, but not between B and C because the jurisdictional amount is
insufficient 2 B, therefore, is a "pendent party" in a suit based on diversity
jurisdiction and, under the common law, could not be joined 4 Under section
1367(a), however, supplemental jurisdiction exists over B, who can be joined as
an "additional party," even though her claim lacks the requisite amount in
controversy as both claims form part of the same case or controversy

20 28 US C § 1367 (1994)
21 Finley 490 US at 555
22 28 U S C § 1367(a) (1994)
23 28 U S C § 1332 (1994)
24 United Mine Workers v Gibbs 383 U S 715 725 (1966)
25 28 U S C § 1367 (1994) See Stromberg Metal Works Inc v Press Mechanical, Inc, 77
F 3d 928 (7th Cir 1996); Shanaghan v Cahill, 58 F 3d 106, 109 (9th Cir 1995); Lewis v
Richardson, No 94-509 JD, 1995 U S Dist LEXIS 16607 at *5 (D N H Nov 8 1995); Booty v
Shoney s, Inc 872 F Supp 1524 1527 (E D La 1995); Garza v National Am Ins Co 807 F
Supp 1256 1257 (M D La 1992); Lindsay v Kvortek, Kasto Serv Inc 865 F Supp 264 272 73
(W.D Pa. 1994) But see First Interstate Mortgage Co v Hinshaw & Culbertson, No 95 C 3867
1995 U S Dist LEXIS 19436 (N D III Dec 27 1995); Chee Chung Leung v Checker Motors
Corp, No 93 C 2704, 1993 U S Dist LEXIS 17174 (N D IIIDec 2, 1994) The question of
whether the additional party language of section 1367(a) overrules the amount in controversy
requirement of Zahn v International Paper Co 414 U S 291 (1973) in the non-class action context
is the subject of significant dispute in the courts See Lindsay v Kvortek, Kasto Serv Inc 865
F Supp 264 273 (W D Pa 1994); Patterson v Bridgestone/Firestone Inc 812 F Supp 1152
1154 55 (D Kan 1993); ITT Comm Fin Corp v Unlimited Automotive Inc 814 F Supp 664
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Jurisdiction can also be exercised over B's claim because it is not prohibited
under any of the exceptions set forth in section 1367(b) 26
B

Limitations on Diversity Jurisdiction

While subsection 1367(a) defines the general principle of supplemental
jurisdiction, subsection 1367(b) contains its exceptions " All such exceptions
apply exclusively to diversity jurisdiction " Section 1367(b) specifically
excludes from supplemental jurisdiction all claims by "plaintiffs against persons
made parties under Rules 14, 19, 20 or 24," and "persons proposed to be joined
as plaintiffs under Rule 19
or 24" when the exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction would be inconsistent with the diversity requirements of section
1332 " Three questions arise from this language What does it mean? How
does it work? Is it a good idea?

1

What Does It Mean?
Simply put, section 1367(b) means that when original jurisdiction is based on
section 1332, a plaintiff cannot use Rules 14, 19, 20 or 24 to bring a claim
against a non-diverse defendant This limitation on diversity jurisdiction has
several rationalizations there is no constitutional basis for subject matter
jurisdiction over such claims, there was no precedential basis under the prior
common law for such claims, and, as a matter of policy, plaintiffs should not be
allowed to circumvent diversity jurisdiction requirements by joining to a lawsuit
new defendants who could not have been sued in federal court in the first place
2

How Does It Work?
Practically speaking, section 1367(b) s limitations on diversity jurisdiction mean
that some "cases or controversies" will not be capable of complete resolution in

669 (N D Il 1992); Haslam v Lefta, lnc No 93 C 4311 1994 U S Dist LEXIS 3623 (N D Ill
Mar 24 1994); Corporate Resources Inc v Southeast Suburban Ambulatory Surgical Center Inc
774 F Supp 503 506 (ND 11 1991) Contra Griffin v Dana Point Condominium Assoc 768
F Supp 1299 (ND 11 1991); Averdick v Republic Fin Servs Inc 803 F Supp 37 45 (ED
Ky 1992); Duet v Lawes No 94-0739 1994 U S Dist LEXIS 4755 (ED La Apr 7, 1994)
26 28 US C § 1367(b) (1994); Miller v. American Home Prods, No 95 3567 1996 US
Dist. LEXIS 2413 (E D Pa. Feb 27, 1996); Patterson v Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc, 812 F Supp
1152 1154(D Kan 1993); Hanshewv US Fidelity & GuarantyCo 746F Supp 55 58(D
Kan 1990); Pellegrino v Pesch, No 91 C 4967 1992 U S Dist LEXIS 9507 (N D 11 June 29
1992); Congram v Giella, No 91 Civ 1134 1992 US Dist LEXIS 17230 (SDNY Nov 10,
1992); Knic Knac Agencies v Masterpiece Apparel, Ltd., No 94 Civ 1073, 1994 U S Dist. LEXIS
7459 (SDNY June 7 1994); Cheramie v Texaco Inc No 91 3114, 1991 US Dist LEXIS
15616 (ED La. Oct 31 1991); Chouest v American Airlines, Inc, 839 F Supp 412, 415 (ED

La 1993)
27
28
29
Housing

28 USC § 1367 (1994)
28 USC § 1367 (1994)
28 U S C § 1367(b) (1994) (emphasis added) See Development Fin Corp v Alpha
& Healthcare 54 F 3d 156, 160 (3d Cir 1995)
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a federal court An example of this phenomenon can be observed in the
application of section 1367 to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14
Example 5

A (Illinois)
5

v

B (New York)
2

4

D (Illinois)

C (Illinois)

In claim 1, A sues B for personal injuries sustained in a car accident In claim
2, B impleads C, its insurance company, under Rule 14(a) In claim 3, C files a
counterclaim against A under Rule 14(a) for contributory negligence In claim
4, A files a claim against C in response to C's counter-claim against A 30 In
claim 5, A files a third-party claim for indemnification against D, A's insurance
company, under Rule 14(b) 31 However, claims 4 and 5 will be barred under
section 1367(b) because each is brought by a 'plaintiff against persons made
parties under Rule 14," and also, because to do otherwise "would be inconsistent
with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332 "32 As a result, B can
implead his insurer for indemnification, but A cannot implead his insurer, even
though there is no diversity for either third-party claim

3

Is It A Good Idea?

Obviously, section 1367(b)'s preclusion of plaintiffs from the full use of Rule
14 results in treating Rule 14 plaintiffs quite differently from all other categories
of litigants 33 Is this disparate treatment constitutional? Due process may
question why one class of litigant should be treated differently from all other
classes of litigants That question, however, must be viewed in light of the
distinction between joinder and jurisdiction The joinder rules merely permit
various configurations of parties and claims to be combined in one lawsuit,
whereas the rules of jurisdiction provide the constitutional basis for the federal

30 FED IL Civ P 14 ( When a counterclaim is asserted against a plaintiff, the plaintiff may
cause a third party to be brought in under circumstances which under this rule would entitle a
defendant to do so )
31 FED R. Crv P 14(b); Chase Manhattan Bank, N A v Aldridge 906 F Supp 866
(S D NY 1995); Janey Montgomery Scott, Inc v Shepard Niles Inc 11 F 3d 399 412 n 15 (3d
Cir 1993); Guaranteed Sys, Inc v American Nat I Can Co 842 F Supp 855 857 58 (M D N C
1994); Fairman, supra note 4 at 177 78

32

FED R. CWv P 14

33

28 U S C § 1367(b) (1994)

See generally Fairman supra note 4 at 175 n lll
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courts' power to preside over the dispute In that light, joinder never trumps
jurisdiction
Even assuming there are no due process problems, section 1367(b)'s disparate
treatment of plaintiffs may not be a good idea The value of the joinder rules is
founded in their ability to efficiently resolve multiple claims, by and against
multiple parties, in one action In some instances, however, section 1367(b)'s
exceptions may virtually defeat Rule 14's efficiency function In Example 5,
assume that in claim 6, B files a counterclaim against A for the personal injuries
she sustained in the car accident Under Rule 14(b), A is then entitled to implead
D, his insurance company 4 However, D and A are not diverse Therefore, A
must litigate against B in federal court and against D in state court Assume that
the federal court finds that A's negligence caused B s injuries and that a judgment
is entered for B Assume also that the state court finds that A did not cause B s
injuries and, therefore, D does not have to indemnify A Now A is stuck in the
unfortunate and litigiously wasteful situation of being liable to B without the
benefit of indemnification What is gained? The federal docket will not be
burdened with A's supplemental claim against D, even though it still will be
burdened with the rest of the action The remainder of the dispute, however, will
be subject to duplicative litigation in the state court
What is lost? The intrinsic value of Rule 14 is neutralized by requiring
multiple suits between the same parties, on the same issues, risking inconsistent
judgments at the expense not only of the plaintiff, but also of the judiciary, which
will then be subject to the indignity of contradicting itself If diversity
jurisdiction is so odious, why single out plaintiffs for such disparate treatment? 35
C

The Guidelines

Section 1367(c) sets forth four "guidelines" under which "courts may decline
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction '3 6 even if the case or controversy
requirement has been met
(1) When the supplemental claim raises a complex or novel issue of state law
(2) When the supplemental claim substantially predominates over the claim on
which the court's original jurisdiction is based;
(3) When the district court has dismissed all jurisdictionally sufficient claims and
only the supplemental claim remains;
(4) When other compelling reasons exist for declining supplemental
jurisdiction "

34 FED R. CIv P 14(b)
35 Judge Easterbrook notes similar incongruencies in the treatment of Rules 19 and 20 by
section 1367 See Stromberg Metal Works Inc v Press Mechanical Inc 77 F 3d 928 (7th Cir

1996)
36
37

28 U S C § 1367(c) (1994)
28 US C § 1367(c) (1994)

HeinOnline -- 27 U. Tol. L. Rev. 93 1995-1996

UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 27

Although this language sounds similar to the Gibbs guidelines, it actually
inverts the Gibbs position 3 Gibbs treated pendent jurisdiction as a power to be
exercised or declined at the discretion of the court 39 Under section 1367(c),
however, the instruction to the court is mandatory ' The language, "[t]be
if'' t any of
district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
the four guidelines exist, implies that absent such conditions, the discretion to
decline jurisdiction does not exist 4 When read in conjunction with the directive
43
in section 1367(a) that district court s "shall have supplemental jurisdiction,9
section 1367(c) actually curtails the courts' discretion to decline jurisdiction over
supplemental claims since, absent any of the guidelines, district courts 'shall"
exercise supplemental jurisdiction '
Grace Periodand the Tolling of the Statute of Limitations
Section 1367(d) tolls the statute of limitations for supplemental claims and
provides a grace period of an additional thirty days after their dismissal from
federal court 45 As a result, no penalty attaches for seeking federal, rather than
state, recourse in the first instance ' More specifically, the thirty-day grace
period saves those supplemental claims dismissed under section 1367(c)(3) which,
after years of litigation in the federal court, may be time-barred 47
D

III DECISION-TREE ANALYSIS
Theories, history, and policy aside, the following decision-tree analysis should
provide a helpful checklist for negotiating section 1367 issues where the original
jurisdiction of the court arises under sections 1331 or 1332
The Five Questions

A

1 Is there a jurisdictionally sufficient claim based on section 1331 or section 1332?
If yes, go to Question 2
2 Is there a jurisdictionally insufficient claim? If yes, go to Question 3
3 Does the insufficient claim arise from the same case or controversy as the
sufficient claim?

38
39
40
(D

United Mine Workers v Gibbs 383 U S 715 725 (1966)
Id at 726
28 U S C § 1367(c) (1994); Gudenkaufv Stauffer Comm Inc, 896 F Supp 1082 1084

Kan. 1995)
41
42

28 US C § 1367(c) (1994)
See Executive Software North America, Inc v United States District Court, 24 F 3d 1545,

1556 (9th Cir 1994)
43
44

28 U S C § 1367(a) (1994) (emphasis added)
28 U S C § 1367(c) (1994) See Executive Software North America, Inc v United States

District Court, 24 F 3d 1545 1556 (9th Cir 1994)
45 28 U S C § 1367(d) (1994)
46 28 U S C § 1367(c) (1994)
47 28 U S C § 1367(cX3) (1994)
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(a)

If the sufficient claim is based on section 1331, then the insufficient
claim qualifies for section 1367(a) treatment even if it requires the
joinder of an "additional party" Go to Question 5
(b) If the sufficient claim is based on section 1332, go to Question 4
(c) If the insufficient claim does not arise from the same case or controversy
as the sufficient claim, then there is no supplemental jurisdiction
Dismiss the insufficient claim and file it in state court per section
1367(d)
4 If the sufficient claim is based on section 1332 is the insufficient claim subject
to any of the exceptions of section 1367(b)?
(a) If yes, then there is no supplemental jurisdiction Dismiss the claim and
file it in state court per section 1367(d)
(b) If no, then you have a supplemental claim even if it requires the joinder
of an "additional party Go to Question 5
5 Does the supplemental claim fall within any of the four guidelines of section
1367(c)?
(a) If yes, dismiss the claim and refile it in state court per section 1367(d)
(b) If no then you can proceed to litigate the supplemental claim in federal
court
B

Application

To demonstrate how the decision-tree analysis works, let us revisit Examples
One and Four
Example 1
A
counterclaim: contract

(Illinois)

v
B

complaint antitrust
(Illinois)

In this example, A, a manufacturer, and B, a distributor, enter into an exclusive
agreement for the nationwide distribution of Power Ranger toys To the surprise
of both A and B, the toys become the hottest items to hit the market since
Cabbage Patch Dolls A observes that B is slow in filling orders and becomes
convinced that B lacks the ability to meet the increasing demand for the product
A is informed by a lawyer that the distributorship contract contains numerous
antitrust problems and that B's distribution practices raise still others A sues B
in federal court under the antitrust laws
B counterclaims for wrongful
termination of the distributorship contract
We can now apply the decision-tree analysis to this example The answer to
Question One is yes, because A's federal antitrust claim satisfies section 1331
jurisdiction The answer to Question Two is yes, because B s breach of contract
claim is jurisdictionally insufficient under both sections 1331 and 1332 The
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answer to Question Three is yes, because both claims arise from the same
distributorship agreement Since the court's original jurisdiction is based on
section 1331, Question Three, subsection (a) informs us that the insufficient claim
qualifies as a supplemental claim and instructs us to skip Question Four and go
directly to Question Five Question Five instructs us to determine if the
supplemental claim falls within any of the four guidelines of section 1367(c)
Assuming that it does not, then Question Five, subsection (b) tells us that we can
proceed to litigate the supplemental claim in federal court
Now, let us play the law professor's favorite game Once the relationship
between the statute and the facts is clearly explained to everyone s satisfaction,
change the facts Assume that instead of one contract, A and B had entered into
two totally separate contracts, one for the national distribution of Power Ranger
toys and one for the exclusive distribution of X-Men toys in Kansas Once A
files the antitrust claim against B for the Power Ranger contract, B counterclaims
for breach of the X-Men contract Now, let us return to the five questions
The answer to Question One remains yes The answer to Question Two
remains yes The answer to Question Three, however, becomes no because the
claim and the counterclaim arise from unrelated disputes Question Three
subsection (c) informs us that B's counterclaim does not qualify as a supplemental
claim, and directs us to dismiss it and refile in state court
To see how the five questions work when the court s original jurisdiction is
based on section 1332, let us re-examine Example Four
Example 4
A (Georgia)
B (Georgia)
v
C (Florida)

complaint personal injury
$60,000 damages
$10,000 damages

Father A and daughter B are simultaneously injured when the car in which they
are driver and passenger is struck by C Diversity exists between A and C, but
does not exist between B and C because the jurisdictional amount is insufficient
Our answers to the Five Questions are as follows: The answer to Question One
is yes, because the original jurisdiction of the court is based on section 1332 The
answer to Question Two is yes, because the amount in controversy as between B
and C is insufficient under section 1332 The answer to Question Three is yes,
because both claims arise out of the same car accident We are then instructed
under Question Three, subsection (b) to proceed to Question Four, which asks if
the insufficient claim is subject to any of the exceptions of section 1367(b) The
answer to this question is no, because B s claim is not made under any of Rules
14, 19, 20 or 24 According to Question Four, subsection (b) we are informed
that we have a supplemental claim and instructed to proceed to Question Five
Assuming, arguendo, that none of section 1367(c)'s guidelines apply, then
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Question Five, subsection (c) informs us that we can proceed to litigate our claim
in federal court
IV

CONCLUSION

The meaning and application of section 1367 now rests with the courts
Current decisions construing the statute reveal considerable discord Despite such
uncertainty, there can be little doubt that supplemental jurisdiction issues will
arise with great frequency in the federal courts Hopefully, the explanations,
examples, and decision-tree analysis contained in this article will provide some
assistance to that endeavor
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